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2Recommendations and Report of the Task Force on US Drone Policy
3FOREWORD
Few recent national security developments have been as controversial as the increased 
US reliance on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), more colloquially known as “drones.” 
While UAVs have multiple peaceful and commercial applications, heated debates about 
the use of lethal UAV strikes away from traditional, territorially bounded battlefields 
have tended to crowd out a broader and more nuanced discussion of US UAV policy.
On May 23, 2013, President Barack Obama acknowledged these debates in a major 
speech at the National Defense University, promising to continue the difficult task of 
ensuring that the use of lethal UAVs is both strategically sound and consistent with 
long-standing US commitments to democracy, accountability and the rule of law. He 
pledged that his administration would “review proposals to extend oversight of lethal 
actions outside of war zones that go beyond our reporting to Congress,” and noted, 
“the use of force must be seen as part of a larger discussion we need to have about a 
comprehensive counterterrorism strategy.”I
In a speech at the US Military Academy (West Point) on May 28, 2014, he reinforced 
this commitment: “[A]s I said last year, in taking direct action, we must uphold stan-
dards that reflect our values. That means taking strikes only when we face a continu-
ing, imminent threat, and only where … there is near certainty of no civilian casual-
ties, for our actions should meet a simple test: we must not create more enemies than 
we take off the battlefield. I also believe we must be more transparent about both the 
basis of our counterterrorism actions and the manner in which they are carried out ... 
when we cannot explain our efforts clearly and publicly, we face terrorist propaganda 
and international suspicion, we erode legitimacy with our partners and our people and 
we reduce accountability in our own government.”II
In an effort to respond to the president’s call for constructive new approaches to think-
ing about UAVs, the Stimson Center created a distinguished 10-member task force 
on US Drone Policy. Task force members bring rich experience in the military, intel-
ligence, foreign policy and legal communities, and over the past year, the task force 
has also solicited comments and ideas from dozens of other experts in the technology, 
human rights and business communities. 
I. Obama, Barack. “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University.” Remarks presented at 
the National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., May 2013. http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university.
II.  “Full transcript of President Obama’s commencement address at West Point.” The Washington Post, May 
28, 2014. Accessed June 4, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/full-text-of-president-obamas-
commencement-address-at-west-point/2014/05/28/cfbcdcaa-e670-11e3-afc6-a1dd9407abcf_story.html
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This report represents a preliminary effort to offer analysis and recommendations that 
could help shape and guide US UAV policy going forward. It looks at the military 
and national security benefits of UAV technologies, analyzes our current approaches 
to UAV development and export, and seeks to contextualize the strategic questions 
relating to the use of lethal UAVs outside traditional battlefields. Ultimately, it offers 
eight detailed recommendations for overhauling UAV strategy; improving oversight, 
accountability and transparency; developing forward-looking international norms re-
lating to the use of lethal force in nontraditional settings; and devising sound UAV 
export control and research and development policies.
UAV technologies are here to stay. Used foolishly, they can endanger our interests, 
diminish regional and global stability, and undermine our values. Used wisely, they 
can help advance our national security interests even as we foster a more robust inter-
national commitment to the rule of law. 
We believe this report offers a useful framework for ensuring that we use these new 
technologies wisely, and we look forward to discussing our recommendations with the 
administration and the public.
 
John Abizaid     Rosa Brooks
June 2014
5TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP
The task forceIII consists of 10 senior-level participants from stakeholder constituencies 
including the US military community, the intelligence community, the legal commu-
nity, academia and the private sector. 
Task force co-chairs:
• Gen. John Abizaid (US Army, retired), JPA Partners, LLC; former Commander, US 
Central Command. 
• Rosa Brooks, Professor of Law, Georgetown University; Senior Fellow, New 
America Foundation; Contributing Editor, Foreign Policy; former Counselor to the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.
Task force members:
• Lt. Gen. David Barno (US Army, retired), Center for a New American Security; 
former head of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan; 
• John B. Bellinger III, Arnold & Porter LLP; former Senior Associate Counsel to the 
President and Legal Adviser to the National Security Council and Legal Adviser for 
the US Department of State; 
• Lincoln P. Bloomfield Jr., Stimson Board Chairman; former Assistant Secretary of 
State for Political Military Affairs; 
• Mary (Missy) Cummings, Associate Professor, Mechanical Engineering & Materials 
Science, Duke University; former US Navy pilot; 
• Janine Davidson, Senior Fellow for Defense Policy, Council on Foreign Relations; for-
mer Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans; former Air Force pilot; 
• Peter Lichtenbaum, Covington & Burling LLP; former Acting Under Secretary of 
Commerce for Industry and Security; former Assistant Secretary of Commerce for 
Export Administration; 
• Philip Mudd, President, Director of Enterprise Risk, SouthernSun Asset Management; 
former Deputy Director of National Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); for-
mer Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Counterterrorism Center;
• Jeffrey Smith, Arnold & Porter LLP; former General Counsel of the CIA; former 
General Counsel of the Senate Armed Services Committee; former Army Judge 
Advocate General (JAG) officer.
III.  Affiliations are listed for identification purposes only; this report represents the views of task force 
members in their individual capacities.
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7A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE
The task force met over a one-year period and was assisted by three expert working 
groups focused on different aspects of current UAV policy:
• Defense utility, national security and economics; 
• Ethics and law; and
• Export controls and regulatory challenges. 
The three working groups met periodically throughout the year, providing detailed 
background reports to the task force, including key data points, topics for consider-
ation and potential recommendations. 
The task force focused primarily on issues relating to the development and use of lethal 
UAVs by the United States. In order to keep this report brief, the task force chose not to 
focus extensively on the following issues:
• The use of UAVs in domestic airspace;
• Privacy concerns related to UAV use;
• The potential future use and development of autonomous, human-out-of-the-
loop weapons systems (or “robots that are capable of selecting targets and deliver-
ing force without any human input or interaction.”)1 
• The precise scope of the 2001 Congressional Authorization to Use Military Force 
(AUMF), debates about revising the AUMF and debates about other domestic 
legal issues relating to the use of lethal force against persons believed to be agents 
of al-Qaida and its associated forces;
• The lethal targeting of US citizens;2 and
• The numerous nonlethal commercial uses of UAV technologies.
The task force views these as important issues, but opted to defer them for a possible 
future report. This report instead focuses generally on key current and emerging is-
sues relating to the development and use of lethal UAVs outside the United States for 
national security purposes. In particular, we focus extensively on the use of UAVs for 
targeted counterterrorism strikes, for the simple reason that this has generated signif-




With their long loiter time, sophisticated sensors and extensive operational reach, un-
manned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are an attractive option for a wide range of military 
and intelligence tasks, including intelligence and reconnaissance, disaster relief and 
humanitarian assistance, transportation, the provision of close air support to soldiers 
in combat, and strikes against targets in relatively distant or inaccessible locations. 
While the overseas use of UAVs for intelligence, reconnaissance, transport and close 
air support has been largely uncontroversial, the growing use of lethal UAVs for tar-
geted counterterrorism strikes away from so-called “hot battlefields” has generated 
substantial attention and criticism. 
US government officials argue that such strikes are both lawful and effective: as 
President Obama said in his May 2013 speech at the National Defense University, 
“Dozens of highly skilled al-Qaida commanders, trainers, bomb makers and oper-
atives have been taken off the battlefield. Plots have been disrupted. … Simply put, 
these strikes have saved lives. Moreover, America’s actions are legal. … [T]his is a 
just war — a war waged proportionally, in last resort, and in self-defense."3
Nevertheless, many commentators question the strategic value of US UAV strikes for 
counterterrorism purposes, arguing that the availability of lethal UAVs has fueled 
a “whack-a-mole” approach to counterterrorism, drawn attention from non-kinetic 
means of combating terrorist organizations, increased anti-American sentiment, erod-
ed norms of sovereignty in ways ultimately likely to be detrimental to US interests, and 
created a slippery slope toward continual or widening conflict and instability. Others 
charge that UAV strikes cause excessive civilian casualties, or worry about the ethical 
and psychological impact of what they view as “remote-control killing.” 
Finally, many critics charge that the availability of lethal UAV technologies has tempt-
ed the United States to engage in a largely covert campaign of targeted killing, creating, 
in effect, a “secret war” governed by secret law. In particular, controversy has swirled 
around what critics view as the relative lack of transparency and accountability in US 
targeted killings, and the potential implications this has for domestic and internation-
al rule of law, especially if other states — including many not known for their human 
rights records — mimic US precedents. 
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TASK FORCE CONCLUSIONS
The Stimson Task Force on UAV Policy believes that UAVs should be neither glori-
fied nor demonized. It is important to take a realistic view of UAVs, recognizing both 
their continuities with more traditional military technologies and the new tactics 
and policies they enable. 
Most US military UAVs are not weaponized, and only a tiny fraction of US govern-
ment UAV missions involve targeted UAV strikes outside of traditional, territorially 
defined battlefields such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. Further, UAVs are 
not a US “super-weapon:” while their use has led to significant tactical successes, they 
are not strategic weapons, and they currently have substantial vulnerabilities as well 
as strengths. The United States does not have a monopoly on UAV technologies or an 
ability to predict all potential countermeasures; indeed, there is reason to fear the rapid 
and uncontrolled proliferation of UAV technologies developed in other states, along 
with the rapid evolution of technologies designed to counter UAVs.
While we do not believe that UAV strikes cause disproportionate civilian casualties or 
turn killing into a “video-game,” we are concerned that the availability of lethal UAV 
technologies has enabled US policies that likely would not have been adopted in the 
absence of UAVs. In particular, UAVs have enabled the United States to engage in the 
cross-border use of lethal force against targeted individuals in an unprecedented and 
expanding way, raising significant strategic, legal and ethical questions.
Strategic Questions
We are concerned that the Obama administration’s heavy reliance on targeted killings 
as a pillar of US counterterrorism strategy rests on questionable assumptions, and risks 
increasing instability and escalating conflicts. While tactical strikes may have helped 
keep the homeland free of major terrorist attacks, existing evidence indicates that both 
Sunni and Shia Islamic extremist groups have grown in scope, lethality and influence in 
the broader area of operations in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia. Furthermore, 
US targeted strikes also create new strategic risks. These include possible erosion of sov-
ereignty norms, blowback and risks of a slippery slope into continual conflict.
Erosion of sovereignty norms: The US government takes the view that it has a legal 
right to use force in the territories of foreign sovereign states when those states are 
“unwilling or unable” to take what the United States considers appropriate action to 
eliminate what it sees as imminent threats. But inevitably, assessments of what consti-
tutes an imminent threat to the United States and what would constitute appropriate 
action are somewhat subjective in nature; the United States may view the use of force 
as justified even when US allies and partners do not. The US use of force in sovereign 
nations whose consent is questionable or nonexistent may encourage other states to 
follow suit with their own military platforms or commercial entities. 
Blowback: Civilian casualties, even if relatively few, can anger whole communities, 
increase anti-US sentiment and become a potent recruiting tool for terrorist organi-
zations. Even strikes that kill only terrorist operatives can cause great resentment, 
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particularly in contexts in which terrorist recruiting efforts rely on tribal loyalties 
or on an economically desperate population. UAV strikes by the United States have 
also generated a backlash in states not directly affected by the strikes, in part due to 
the perception that such strikes cause excessive civilian deaths, and in part due to 
concerns about sovereignty, transparency, accountability and other human rights 
and rule of law issues. 
Slippery Slope: The increasing use of lethal UAVs may create a slippery slope leading 
to continual or wider wars. The seemingly low-risk and low-cost missions enabled by 
UAV technologies may encourage the United States to fly such missions more often, 
pursuing targets with UAVs that would be deemed not worth pursuing if manned 
aircraft or special operation forces had to be put at risk. For similar reasons, however, 
adversarial states may be quicker to use force against American UAVs than against 
US manned aircraft or military personnel. UAVs also create an escalation risk inso-
far as they may lower the bar to enter a conflict, without increasing the likelihood of 
a satisfactory outcome. 
The US use of lethal UAVs for targeted strikes outside of hot battlefields is likely to be 
imitated by other states. Such potential future increase in the use of lethal UAV strikes 
by foreign states may cause or increase instability, and further increase the risk of wid-
ening conflicts in regions around the globe.
Lack of Strategic Analysis: In recent years, US targeted strikes involving UAVs have gone 
from a relative rarity to a relatively common practice in Pakistan and Yemen. As the 
number of strikes increases, so, too, does the strategic risk. To the best of our knowledge, 
however, the US executive branch has yet to engage in a serious cost-benefit analysis of 
targeted UAV strikes as a routine counterterrorism tool. 
There are numerous non-kinetic means of combatting terrorism; some of these — e.g., 
efforts to disrupt terrorist communications and finances — can easily be combined 
with targeted strikes, while others — e.g., efforts to build friendly relationships with 
local communities and inspire cooperation — may be less easily combined. A seri-
ous counterterrorism strategy needs to consider carefully, and constantly reassess, the 
balance between kinetic action and other counterterrorism tools, and the potential 
unintended consequences of increased reliance on lethal UAVs.
Legal and Ethical Issues
Transparency: The administration has disclosed details relating to only a handful of 
targeted strikes against American citizens: for the most part, the identities of those 
targeted and the basis for their targeting have not been disclosed. Details relating to 
incidents that may have involved civilian casualties also have not been disclosed. In 
formal court filings, the administration continues to state that it will neither confirm 
nor deny particular strikes, or even the existence of such strikes as a general matter. 
We recognize that US officials frequently have compelling reasons to refrain from pro-
viding some of this information to the public, and we believe that US government deci-
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sion-makers make targeting decisions in good faith and with genuine care. Nonetheless, 
we are concerned by the continuing lack of transparency relating to US targeted killings.
Law versus the Rule of Law: From a US government perspective, the United States 
is in an armed conflict with al-Qaida and its “associated forces.” As an international 
law matter, the existence of an armed conflict triggers the applicability of the law of 
armed conflict, which permits the United States to target al-Qaida operatives as enemy 
combatants. By extension, members of organizations that fight alongside al-Qaida are 
also targetable as co-belligerents — and unlike ordinary domestic law or international 
human rights law, the law of armed conflict does not require the United States to pro-
vide “due process” to enemy combatants before targeting them. International law also 
recognizes that states have the right to use armed force outside their own borders when 
doing so is necessary to prevent an imminent attack, and US officials have therefore 
argued that targeted strikes against terror suspects are permitted both under the law 
of armed conflict and under the international law of self-defense.
These are plausible interpretations of the law, and we disagree with those critics who 
have declared that US targeted killings are “illegal.” But changing technologies and 
events have made it increasingly difficult to apply the law of armed conflict and the 
international law relating to the use of force in a consistent and principled manner, 
leading to increasing divergence between “the law” and core rule of law principles that 
traditionally have animated US policy.
The rise of transnational non-state terrorist organizations confounds preexisting legal 
categories. In a conflict so sporadic and protean, the process of determining where and 
when the law of armed conflict applies, who should be considered a combatant and what 
count as “hostilities” is inevitably fraught with difficulty. While our military and intel-
ligence communities have grown increasingly adept both at identifying and confirm-
ing the identities of al-Qaida affiliates and at precise and careful targeting, the criteria 
used to determine who might be considered targetable remain unknown to the public. 
Similarly, it is difficult to understand how the US government determines the “immi-
nence” of unknown types of future attacks being planned by unknown individuals. 
These enormous uncertainties are multiplied further when the United States relies on 
intelligence and other targeting information provided by a host nation government: 
how can we be sure we are not being drawn into a civil war or being used to target the 
domestic political enemies of the host state leadership?
The legal norms governing armed conflicts and the use of force look clear on paper, 
but the changing nature of modern conflicts and security threats has rendered them 
almost incoherent in practice. Basic categories such as “battlefield,” “combatant” and 
“hostilities” no longer have clear or stable meaning. When this happens, the rule of law 
is threatened. The United States was founded upon rule of law principles, and histori-
cally has sought to ensure that its own actions, international law and the actions of for-
eign states are consistent with these principles. Today, however, despite the undoubted 
good faith of US decision-makers, it would be difficult to conclude that US targeted 
strikes are consistent with core rule of law norms. 
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International Precedents: From the perspective of many around the world, the 
United States currently appears to claim, in effect, the legal right to kill any person 
it determines is a member of al-Qaida or its associated forces, in any state on Earth, 
at any time, based on secret criteria and secret evidence, evaluated in a secret pro-
cess by unknown and largely anonymous individuals — with no public disclosure of 
which organizations are considered “associated forces” (or how combatant status is 
determined or how the United States defines “participation in hostilities”), no means 
for anyone outside that secret process to raise questions about the criteria or validity 
of the evidence, and no means for anyone outside that process to identify or remedy 
mistakes or abuses. US practices set a dangerous precedent that may be seized upon 
by other states — not all of which are likely to behave as scrupulously as US officials. 
Democratic Accountability: Increased US reliance on lethal UAVs in cross-border tar-
geted strikes also poses challenges to democracy and the American system of checks 
and balances. While we understand the administration’s reasons for considering ad-
ditional transparency difficult, the effect of the lack of transparency is that the United 
States has been fighting what amounts to a covert, multi-year killing program. Without 
additional information, the citizenry cannot evaluate US targeted strikes. 
Unmanned aerial vehicle strikes also raise questions about the continued efficacy of 
traditional congressional oversight mechanisms. The Obama administration contin-
ues to rely on the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) as the primary 
domestic legal basis for US targeted strikes outside of “hot” battlefields, but the ad-
ministration’s interpretation of the AUMF is extraordinarily broad — and even many 
former executive branch officials question whether Congress intended to authorize 
such an unbounded conflict when the AUMF was passed in 2001. 
The covert or unacknowledged nature of most UAV targeted strikes also makes it dif-
ficult for Congress to perform its vital oversight functions. CIA UAV strikes constitute 
“covert action” under US law, which means that the CIA need not give prior notice of 
particular covert operations to any members of Congress except the so-called “Gang 
of Eight.” After a covert action, the executive branch is required to notify the full intel-
ligence committees, but not the full Congress. 
By law, the US military is prohibited from engaging in covert action. It is important to 
emphasize, however, that the military is not prohibited from engaging in secret, unac-
knowledged activities that are intended to remain unacknowledged, as long as these 
activities constitute “traditional military activities” under US law. 
From the perspective of laypersons, both the CIA and the military can thus engage in 
covert strikes in the colloquial sense of the term. But while covert action undertaken 
by the CIA requires a presidential finding and notification — even if after the fact — of 
the congressional intelligence committees, secret, unacknowledged strikes carried out 
by the US military need not be reported to the intelligence committees, as the military 
reports instead to the House and Senate Armed Services committees. 
At best, this fragmented oversight system creates confusion and a danger that critical 
issues may slip through the cracks. This fragmented oversight system is particularly 
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problematic given that in practice, the military and CIA generally work together 
quite closely when planning and executing targeted UAV strikes: few strikes are “all 
military” or “all CIA.” The differing CIA and military reporting requirements create 
a risk of executive branch “forum shopping,” tempting the executive branch to place 
a given targeted strike under the direction and control of whichever entity is deemed 
to have the most accommodating committee members. Even when the appropriate 
congressional committees are fully briefed, the classified nature of targeted strikes, 
whether CIA or military, makes oversight a challenge. 
Future Technological Developments
UAV technologies will continue to evolve rapidly. Looking into the near future, it 
seems likely that an increasing number of weapons will be adapted for use on UAV 
platforms such that any weapon developed for a manned aircraft will soon be launch-
able from an unmanned aircraft. UAVs will become more interoperable, and system 
software likely will evolve to integrate multiple UAVs across an entire “combat cloud.” 
Autonomous UAV capabilities will also likely be developed. 
These likely future technological developments have the potential to be used both for 
good and for ill, and the time to discuss their potential implications is now. Among 
other things, we will need to reevaluate existing UAV-related Federal Aviation 
Administration rules and export control rules; at the moment, US export control rules 
for UAVs do not appear well-suited to advancing US national security objectives.
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of the foregoing concerns and conclusions, the task force makes the following 
recommendations:
1. Conduct a rigorous strategic review and cost-benefit analysis of the role of lethal 
UAVs in targeted counterterrorism strikes to evaluate the impact of past UAV strikes 
on terrorist organizations, affected communities, public opinion, litigation, defense 
policy and government cooperation with allies and partner nations.
2. Improve transparency in targeted UAV strikes: as a general principle, the United 
States should acknowledge the use of lethal force in foreign countries both to Congress 
and to the American public. While secrecy may be required before and during each 
strike, strikes generally should be acknowledged by the United States after the fact. The 
president should publicly release information on: the approximate number and gen-
eral location of targeted UAV strikes; the number of individuals known to have been 
killed and their organizational affiliations; the number and identities of any civilians 
known to be killed, and the approximate number of strikes carried out by the military 
versus the CIA. The president should also order the preparation and public release of a 
detailed report explaining the legal basis under domestic and international law for the 
United States conducting targeted killings. 
3. Transfer general responsibility for carrying out lethal UAV strikes from the CIA 
to the military. While rare exceptions may be warranted, as a general principle, the 
15
Executive Summary
military should be the entity responsible for the use of lethal force outside the United 
States, while the CIA should focus on intelligence collection and analysis.
4. Develop more robust oversight and accountability mechanisms for targeted strikes 
outside of traditional battlefields. The president should, by executive order, create a 
nonpartisan, independent commission to review lethal UAV policy. Members of this 
independent commission should be selected with a view to ensuring credibility and di-
versity of background. The commission should not be directly involved in the pre-strike 
approval process, but should be tasked with reviewing the overall policy and approval 
process for the use of lethal UAV strikes (both military and CIA); unclassified versions 
of the commission’s reports to the president and Congress should be released publicly.
5. Foster the development of appropriate international norms for the use of lethal 
force outside traditional battlefields. These norms should rest upon a joint commit-
ment to ensuring that states have the ability to respond effectively to nontraditional 
threats from nontraditional actors and a commitment to ensuring that the use of lethal 
force remains consistent with core rule of law principles and respect for fundamental 
human rights. Rules and practices relating to the state use of lethal force should be 
transparent and clear; lethal force should not be used without adequate safeguards to 
prevent arbitrariness and protect against error and abuse; and impartial accountability 
mechanisms must be available to investigate credible allegations of error and abuse, 
and, if appropriate, provide remedies.
6. Assess UAV-related technological developments and likely future trends, and 
develop an interagency research and development strategy geared toward advanc-
ing US national security interests in a manner consistent with our values. This review 
should also flag any legal, ethical and strategic implications of emerging UAV-related 
technologies, including the possible future development of autonomous weapons sys-
tems, and lead to the development of a holistic interagency research, development and 
use strategy for UAVs.
7. Review and reform UAV-related export control rules and FAA rules, with a view 
to minimizing unnecessary regulatory burdens on the development of the US UAV 
industry, while still safeguarding our national security interests and ensuring respon-
sible UAV development and use.
8. The FAA should accelerate its efforts to meet the requirements of the 2012 FAA 
Reauthorization Bill to ensure the safe integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems 
into the national airspace system by Sept. 30, 2015, as required by law, but also consid-
er whether certain commercial UAVs can be operated safely in the national airspace 
prior to that date, and make exemptions as permitted as a stopgap measure toward 
the development of a comprehensive regulatory framework for both government and 
privately operated UAVs.
16




Throughout human history, the ability to project force across significant distances 
has been a sought-after military capability, and innovations in the creation and use of 
long-distance weapons have at times enabled major social and political shifts. 
Perhaps for this reason, significant innovations in long-distance weapons have fre-
quently been greeted with decidedly mixed feelings. In the Middle Ages, for instance, 
feudal elites feared that the crossbow — which could be used even by minimally trained 
peasants, and was capable of shooting armor-piercing bolts — would upend the chi-
valric social order, rendering irrelevant knightly martial skills and suits of armor.4 
Depicted in medieval illuminated manuscripts as a weapon of demons, the crossbow 
was banned by Pope Urban in 1096. It proved too temptingly useful a weapon to ig-
nore, however; by 1139, the Second Lateran Council of Pope Innocent II “prohibit[ed] 
under anathema that murderous art of crossbowmen and archers, which is hateful 
to God”— but only when “employed against Christians and Catholics.” 5 Eventually, 
crossbows were deemed acceptable for use in “just” wars. 6
A few hundred years later, the advent of gunpowder weapons made both the crossbow 
and longbow obsolete. In 1435, Byzantine Constantinople fell to the heavy artillery of 
the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II, stunning the Christian world. Although the West soon 
embraced gunpowder warfare, it was not without ambivalence: In Henry VI, Part I, 
Shakespeare’s Hotspur recalls a courtier complaining of the “villainous salt-petre … 
digged/ Out of the bowels of the harmless Earth” to create “these vile guns.” In 1605, 
Cervantes’ Don Quixote denounced artillery as a “devilish invention,” allowing “a 
base cowardly hand to take the life of the bravest gentleman,” with bullets “coming 
nobody knows how or from whence.”7 
In our own era, the development of lethal unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has gener-
ated similar consternation. Like the crossbow, the longbow, the cannon, the machine 
gun, the long-distance bomber and the cruise missile, UAVs — also referred to as “re-
motely piloted aircraft” (RPAs) or, more colloquially, as “drones” — are often viewed 
as a military “game-changer,” offering soldiers and policymakers expanded tactical 
options against a broad array of targets.8 And like other long-distance weapon innova-
tions from times past, lethal UAVs have been both praised and vilified. 
18
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UAV ATTRIBUTES AND USES
UAVs share some distinct attributes, which have made them attractive for military and 
counterterrorist operations:9 
• Persistence: UAVs have the ability to loiter over a specific area for extended peri-
ods of time, allowing them to capture and collect more information 10 and allow-
ing the user to observe, evaluate and act quickly. 11
• Precision: In military applications, UAVs’ sensor technology can provide for more 
precise information collection that facilitates more accurate targeting as well as 
battlefield and non-battlefield surveillance.
• Operational Reach: Because of longer flying times, UAVs can be used to project 
force from afar in environments that may otherwise be inaccessible or too dan-
gerous for manned operations.
• Force protection: UAVs allow the user to have a military presence in areas that 
otherwise would be impossible politically, capacity/resource prohibitive, too dan-
gerous to risk being shot down, or topographically inhospitable.
• Stealth: While today’s UAVs can be readily detected by sophisticated air defense 
systems, most UAVs are relatively small, quiet and capable of being flown at high 
enough altitudes to avoid detection by the individuals being surveilled or targeted.
UAVs have substantial value for a wide range of military and intelligence tasks. On 
the battlefield, both weaponized and nonweaponized UAVs can protect and aid sol-
diers in a variety of ways. They can be used for reconnaissance purposes, for instance, 
and UAVs also have the potential to assist in the detection of chemical, biological, ra-
diological and nuclear weapons, as well as ordinary explosives.12 Weaponized UAVs 
can be used to provide close air support to soldiers engaged in combat.13 
UAVs also have enormous potential as transport vehicles: the Navy is exploring the use 
of UAVs to transport badly wounded casualties to field trauma units, while the Army 
is examining similar UAV applications for medical evacuation missions. Meanwhile, 
the Marine Corps has used two remotely piloted helicopters for cargo transport and 
resupply purposes, using external sling loads to deliver cargo in mountainous and hos-
tile terrain. 14 The military is also exploring the viability of using UAVs as an over-the-
horizon communication relay tool.15 
Military UAVs are also employed for disaster relief and humanitarian assistance pur-
poses: Air Force UAVs provided vital imagery after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti16 and 
the typhoon that devastated the Philippines in November 2013,17 and Air National 
Guard UAVs assisted firefighters combatting wildfires in California in August 2013.18 19
Over the past decade, weaponized UAVs have also become a widely used tool for coun-
tering geographically diffuse terrorist networks. With their low profile and relative fuel 
efficiency — and without the constraints of pilot fatigue — a typical UAV can spend 
more “time on target” than manned aircraft, enabling better intelligence-gathering 
and greater targeting precision, and reducing the risk of civilian casualties in missile 
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strikes.20 The use of UAVs also allows the United States to honor the preferences of 
partner nations that may be amenable to US missile strikes against targets in their 
territory, but unwilling to allow a sizeable US military presence on the ground. Better 
still, from a force protection perspective, lethal UAVs enable the United States to strike 
targets in dangerous and inaccessible areas with no short-term risk to US personnel. 
Unmanned aerial vehicles have been used extensively in Afghanistan and Iraq, for in-
telligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) purposes, to carry out strikes and to 
provide close air support to ground troops. They have also become a weapon of choice 
for counterterrorism strikes in regions where US troops are not engaged in ground 
combat. Between 2004 and 2014, US UAV strikes in Pakistan are estimated to have 
killed approximately 2,000 to 4,000 people, while US strikes in Yemen are estimated 
to have killed several hundred people.21 A small number of UAV strikes are believed to 
have occurred in Somalia, and there are also unconfirmed reports of US UAV strikes 
in a handful of other countries, including Mali and the Philippines. 
CONTROVERSY AND CRITICISM
While the use of UAVs for ISR, transport and close air support has been largely uncon-
troversial, the growing use of lethal UAVs for targeted counterterrorism strikes away 
from so-called hot battlefields has generated substantial attention and criticism.22
US government officials argue that such strikes are both lawful and effective: as President 
Barack Obama said in a May 2013 speech, “the United States has taken lethal, targeted 
action against al-Qaida and its associated forces, including with remotely piloted aircraft 
commonly referred to as drones. … Dozens of highly skilled al-Qaida commanders, 
trainers, bomb makers and operatives have been taken off the battlefield. Plots have been 
disrupted. … Simply put, these strikes have saved lives. Moreover, America’s actions are 
legal.… We are at war with an organization that right now would kill as many Americans 
as they could if we did not stop them first. So this is a just war — a war waged propor-
tionally, in last resort, and in self-defense.”
Nevertheless, some commentators question the strategic value of US UAV strikes for 
counterterrorism purposes, arguing that the availability of lethal UAVs has fueled a 
“whack-a-mole” approach to counterterrorism, drawn attention away from non-ki-
netic means of combating terrorist organizations, increased anti-American sentiment, 
eroded norms of sovereignty in ways ultimately likely to be detrimental to US interests, 
and created a slippery slope toward continual or widening conflict and instability. 23
Others charge that UAV strikes cause excessive civilian casualties. The United 
Kingdom-based Bureau for Investigative Journalism estimates that US UAV strikes in 
Pakistan have killed between 416 and 951 civilians, for instance, including as many as 
200 children, 24 and reports by human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
have used similar estimates.25 
Administration officials have questioned such figures, and in May 2013, President 
Obama stated that no UAV strikes are authorized outside of “hot battlefields” unless 
there is “near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured.”26 Nonetheless, sev-
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eral recent and well-publicized incidents involving civilian casualties have continued 
to fuel criticism, and the administration’s failure to provide its own casualty estimates 
or explain its methodology for determining civilian casualty numbers has done little 
to reduce such criticisms.27 
Other critics worry about the ethical and psychological impact of what they view as 
“remote-control killing.” Thus, Phillip Alston, the United Nations special rapporteur 
on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, and Hina Shamsi of the American 
Civil Liberties Union criticize what they see as “the PlayStation mentality”28 created by 
UAV technologies: “Young military personnel raised on a diet of video games now kill 
real people remotely using joysticks. Far removed from the human consequences of 
their actions, how will this generation of fighters value the right to life?”29 
Finally, many critics, from human rights NGOs to the New York Times editorial 
board,30 worry that the availability of lethal UAV technologies has tempted the United 
States to engage in a largely covert campaign of targeted killing, creating, in effect, a 
“secret war” governed by secret law. These critics focus not on UAVs as such, but the 
degree to which UAV technologies have enabled the United States to use lethal force 
against individuals located outside of traditional, territorially defined battlefields (e.g., 
Afghanistan, Iraq or Libya). 
In particular, controversy has swirled around what critics view as the relative lack of 
transparency and accountability in US targeted killings, and the potential implications 
this has for domestic and international rule of law, especially if other states — includ-
ing many not known for their human rights records — mimic US precedents. 
21
TASK FORCE CONCLUSIONS
This report represents the culmination of a year-long process of consultations and 
discussions with current and former government and military officials, academic 
researchers, NGO experts, legal experts and industry leaders. While the views we 
solicited varied widely, members of the Stimson Task Force came to a number of 
strong, shared conclusions.
We believe that UAVs should be neither glorified nor demonized. It is important to 
take a realistic view of UAVs, recognizing both their continuities with more traditional 
military technologies and the new tactics and policies they enable. 
In general, we believe that the political and media discourse on UAVs has been charac-
terized by a number of significant misconceptions. In the first part of this section, we 
attempt to dispel some common misconceptions about UAVs. 
Specifically, we note that most US military UAVs are not weaponized, and only a tiny 
fraction of US government UAV missions involve targeted UAV strikes outside of tra-
ditional, territorially defined battlefields such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. 
Further, UAVs are not US “super-weapons:” while their use has led to significant tac-
tical successes, they are not “strategic” weapons, and they currently have substantial 
vulnerabilities as well as strengths. Contrary to popular belief, UAVs are not necessar-
ily cheaper than manned aircraft, and the United States does not have a monopoly on 
UAV technologies or an ability to predict all potential countermeasures; indeed, there 
is reason to fear the rapid and uncontrolled proliferation of UAV technologies devel-
oped in other states, along with the rapid evolution of technologies designed to counter 
UAVs. Finally, we address the widespread but erroneous belief that UAV strikes are apt 
to cause disproportionate civilian casualties, together with the claim that UAVs “turn 
killing into a video game.”
In the second part of this section, we note that while UAVs, as such, present few new 
moral or legal issues, the availability of lethal UAV technologies has enabled US policies 
that likely would not have been adopted in the absence of UAVs. In particular, UAVs 
have enabled the United States to engage in the cross-border use of lethal force against 
targeted individuals in an unprecedented and expanding way. 
In our view, the expanding use of targeted killings outside of hot battlefields raises 
numerous concerns, some strategic and some legal and ethical. The second part of this 
section discusses those concerns.
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DISPELLING MISCONCEPTIONS
Most UAVs are not weaponized, and only a tiny fraction of US UAV 
missions involve targeted UAV strikes outside of traditional battlefields.
Most US UAVs are unarmed: for instance, the US Department of Defense (DoD) cur-
rently operates more than 8,000 unmanned aerial vehicles,31 which in 2010 made up 
41 percent of all DoD aircraft, and less than 1 percent of these UAVs carry operational 
weapons at any given time (though a higher percentage of the vehicles are designed to 
carry weapons if needed).32 To date, the majority of US UAV missions have been for in-
telligence, surveillance and reconnaissance purposes. 33 It is the remaining small frac-
tion of UAV missions that includes targeted strikes of al-Qaida and associated forces, 
primarily conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and to a lesser extent 
by the military.34 While such targeted UAV strikes have generated substantial and le-
gitimate concerns, it is important not to equate UAV technologies solely with lethal 
counterterrorism strikes.
UAVs are not “super-weapons.” 
In most respects, UAVs are merely a variant of existing aerial weapons delivery plat-
forms. They have some capabilities existing manned aircraft lack: as noted previously, 
they can spend far more time on target, with no risk to US personnel. But sophisticat-
ed manned military aircraft possess many capabilities that existing UAVs lack: UAVs 
are far more vulnerable than manned aircraft to being “hijacked” remotely by hostile 
forces with the requisite technologies, for instance, and they are currently also more 
vulnerable to air defenses.35 All this may change as UAV technologies evolve: enhance-
ments in UAV range, speed, stealth and autonomy will be crucial in ensuring that the 
next generation of UAVs can survive in contested areas with sophisticated anti-access 
and area-denial capabilities. UAV countermeasures will evolve alongside UAVs, how-
ever, and they will evolve in ways difficult to predict. 
In sum, while UAVs already have become an extremely valuable military tool on tra-
ditional battlefields and beyond, they are not magic; they do not create “super-weap-
ons” that can enable the United States to strike any person, anywhere on Earth, at 
any time. For now, the military utility of lethal UAVs is mostly limited to situations 
in which they are used, either with host nation acquiescence or in territories lacking 
sophisticated air defense systems, against relatively isolated terrorist targets. 
UAVs are not inherently cheaper than manned aircraft.
Discussions of UAVs often assume that unmanned systems will always be less ex-
pensive to operate than their manned counterparts.36 In addition, acquisition costs 
of a UAV platform tend to be lower than for manned platforms. Thus, the cost for 
replacing a downed UAV is likely to be less than replacing its manned equivalent. 
But properly assessing the cost and cost-effectiveness of aircraft is complex, and many 
numerical comparisons are measuring apples and oranges. One major problem in as-
sessing the cost of a UAV — or any aircraft, for that matter — is the fact that there is 
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more than one way to define the “cost” of owning and operating a military aircraft. 
Cost estimates might include not only the direct fuel consumption of an aircraft but 
also various types of maintenance and personnel costs; these maintenance and person-
nel costs could include only the costs of pilots, ground crews working on the plane, and 
the equipment those ground crews use.37 A broader cost measure could also include 
the costs for operating the base at which those aircraft are located as well as broader 
infrastructure and training costs related to maintaining a fleet of aircraft. 
Moreover, sometimes higher cost may simply reflect greater capability. For example, 
some UAVs carry more sensors than their manned counterparts, which might trans-
late into higher costs for personnel needed to monitor and analyze data streams that do 
not exist on manned platforms, as well as the costs for the hardware and software that 
go into the sensor packages. Meanwhile, a manned F-16 fighter jet may have higher 
costs partially because it consumes fuel more quickly than an MQ-1Predator drone, 
but its far greater speed gives it air-to-air combat abilities that current UAVs lack.38 
Measures of cost-effectiveness, thus, can vary significantly depending on which crite-
ria of effectiveness are used.39 All told, any cost estimate will be subject to questions 
about whether it is accurately capturing the relevant costs associated with an aircraft, 
and costs alone are not sufficient for assessing the cost-effectiveness of a platform. 
Depending on the mission, a seemingly more “expensive” aircraft may in fact be more 
cost-effective than a less expensive platform.40
The United States does not have a monopoly on UAV technologies. 
At the moment, the United States has the world’s largest and most sophisticated fleet 
of weaponized UAVs,41 but it is likely that numerous other states — and perhaps non-
state actors — will expand their own lethal UAV fleets in the future.42 More generally, 
although the global market for UAV systems is set to more than double over the next de-
cade, increasing from $5.2 billion annually in 2013 to $11.6 billion in 2023,43 the United 
States is not likely to remain the world leader in the development of innovative UAV 
technologies.44 In fact, despite the enormous commercial potential of civilian UAVs,45 
civilian UAV development in the United States — especially among small- and medi-
um-sized enterprises — is hampered both by somewhat clumsy export control rules 
and by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations. 46 Outside of the United 
States, UAVs increasingly are being developed for agriculture, weather tracking and in-
frastructure maintenance. 
Current US export control regulations are unclear in their distinction between “un-
armed military unmanned aerial vehicles” on the one hand and non-military or com-
mercial UAVs on the other, with the former being subject to the stricter export con-
trols. In reality, the distinction between UAV technologies developed for commercial 
and civilian purposes and military UAVs is far from sharp; many UAV technological 
developments have both military and nonmilitary applications. But this type of am-
biguity in export control regulations creates uncertainty for UAV manufacturers re-
garding the conditions under which exports will be allowed, and makes it hard for 
them to assess the ultimate size of the international market that will be available to 
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different types of UAVs. Such market information factors heavily into manufacturers’ 
decisions regarding the types and quantities of UAVs they will develop, produce and 
export. In the face of uncertainty, manufacturers tend to act conservatively to produce 
UAVs whose export control status is known — but this could chill innovation and dull 
the technological edge the United States enjoys in the UAV arena, with negative conse-
quences both for the civilian sector and for the military. 
Meanwhile, FAA regulations generally do not allow UAVs to operate in the “national 
airspace system” (NAS). In cases where UAVs are flown, the operators must have spe-
cial permits that are often quite restrictive. Congress moved to allow UAVs to operate 
in domestic airspace with its passage of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 
2012, which set a deadline of Sept. 30, 2015, to integrate UAVs into the national air-
space system.47 
The FAA’s response to this legislation has been somewhat slow, however; the act re-
quired the FAA to produce a roadmap for the integration of UAVs within a year of 
its enactment, effectively setting a deadline of Feb. 14, 2013.48 The roadmap, however, 
was not released until Nov. 7, 2013, missing the deadline by nearly nine months. These 
delays have costs: while US civilian UAV developers await greater government clarity 
on domestic UAV uses, civilian UAV markets abroad have rapidly expanded, 49 and 
other nations already have begun to address one of the most significant hurdles to 
integrating UAVs with civilian airspace: determining how UAV pilots will avoid in-air 
collisions without the lines of sight and situational awareness available to a pilot in the 
cockpit, including testing “sense-and-avoid” capabilities.50
The FAA is grappling with important and difficult issues. Yet should the FAA’s 
months-long delays turn into years-long delays, the United States risks losing the ini-
tiative in the development of commercial UAV technology. The state that becomes the 
“first-mover” to fully integrate UAVs into their national airspace may, if given enough 
of a lead, become a center for the development and sale of UAVs, giving a competi-
tive edge to its domestic manufacturers. If another state gains such an advantage, the 
United States would then be in a position of playing catch-up in terms of establish-
ing its market for commercial UAVs, restoring American manufacturers’ edge on the 
global market, and ensuring US military UAVs remain technologically more advanced 
than those of other nations.
Unless the United States can find ways to jump-start the broader civilian UAV devel-
opment sector, foreign UAV buyers will turn increasingly to countries developing more 
advanced platforms, and the United States will gradually lose any ability to shape UAV 
use abroad. Many of the UAVs developed for foreign markets will be used solely for 
peaceful purposes, but we cannot assume that this will always be the case,51 as many 
UAV technologies developed for commercial civilian purposes can be “weaponized.”52
UAVs do not “cause” disproportionately high civilian casualties.
 Lethal UAV strikes frequently have been criticized for their alleged tendency to cause 
excessive civilian casualties. This criticism has little basis in fact. Contrary to popular 
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belief, UAV technologies, in fact, enable greater precision in targeting than most other 
common means of warfare. 
UAVs are a platform for tactical air-to-surface missiles, such as Hellfire II missiles, 
which themselves are very accurate munitions for tactical strikes, whether they are 
launched from manned or unmanned platforms. In contrast to manned aircraft, how-
ever, UAVs enable “persistent surveillance”: they can spend hours, days, weeks or even 
months monitoring a potential target. Equipped with imaging technologies that en-
able operators, who may be thousands of miles away, to see details as fine as individual 
faces, modern UAV technologies allow their operators to distinguish between civilians 
and combatants far more effectively than most other weapons systems — including, 
most especially, manned aircraft. 
No weapons system is perfect, and targeting decisions — whether for UAV strikes or 
for any other weapons delivery system — are only as good as the intelligence on which 
they are based. We do not doubt that some US UAV strikes have killed innocent civil-
ians. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence suggests that the number of civilians killed is 
small compared to the civilian deaths typically associated with other weapons delivery 
systems (including manned aircraft). The frequency and number of civilian casualties 
resulting from US drone strikes also appear to have dropped sharply in recent years, as 
UAV technologies have improved and targeting rules have been tightened.53
UAVs do not turn killing into “a video-game.”
There is also little reason to view UAVs as uniquely creating a “PlayStation mentality” 
about war. As noted earlier, there is nothing new about discomfort with innovations in 
long-distance weapons. UAVs permit killing from a safe distance — but so do cruise mis-
siles and snipers’ guns. And ironically, the men and women who remotely operate lethal 
UAVs have a far more “up close and personal” view of the damage they inflict than the 
pilots of manned aircraft, who speed past their targets in seconds from far above. In fact, 
some evidence suggests that UAV operators are particularly vulnerable to post-traumatic 
stress: they may watch their targets for weeks or even months, seeing them go about the 
routines of daily life, before one day watching on-screen as they are obliterated.54 
CONCERNS
Evolution of Technology
As a threshold matter, it is important to note that lethal UAVs as such present few new 
legal or policy issues, and many of the most-frequently voiced criticisms of UAVs are 
actually criticisms of the policy decisions and legal questions relating to their current 
use. But the fact that UAVs per se present no new moral or legal issues does not mean 
that there is no reason to be concerned about UAV technologies and their use. 
Since the dawn of mechanization, militaries have sought to replace people with more 
effective machines. The development of UAVs has continued this pattern.55 Although 
technological progress can reduce costs, increase efficiency and create new capabilities, 
we should not become infatuated with new technological toys, or overconfident in the 
ability of new technologies to solve complex problems.56 Most important, we must en-
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sure that policy and strategy drive technological development, and that alluring new 
technologies do not drive policy instead. 
As a nation, we need to think hard about the direction of future UAV-related research, 
development, export controls and legal norms. As noted previously, UAV-related tech-
nologies are evolving rapidly, and much of that evolution is driven by the civilian com-
mercial sector and by foreign markets and foreign manufacturers. If we do not make 
thoughtful decisions now about the technologies we want and do not want to see devel-
oped and the rules that should govern their sale and use, UAV technologies will evolve 
without our guidance. 
Likely Technological Advances
Looking into the near future, it seems likely that an increasing number of weapons will 
be adapted for use on UAV platforms such that any weapon developed for a manned 
aircraft will soon be launchable from an unmanned aircraft. UAVs will become more 
interoperable, and system software likely will evolve to integrate multiple UAVs across 
an entire “combat cloud.” Although development in this area is still in its infancy — and 
problems persist including overloading the command and control link and lost data con-
nections — we are likely to see continued advances in UAV interoperability.57 
Advances in UAV interoperability will provide a variety of battlefield advantages, in-
cluding improved situational awareness, transfer of surveillance data, coordination, 
navigation with respect to other aircraft, and even UAV self-organization for offensive 
capabilities. 58 UAV “swarms” — groups of UAVs that communicate and perform coor-
dinated tasks59 — increasingly will be used in a variety of missions, including provid-
ing more precise ISR.60 
Another factor to consider is the probable future development of autonomous UAV ca-
pabilities. Autonomy could be a major enabler in anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) 
zones, where remote-piloting and real-time links may be compromised.61 Autonomy 
could grant UAVs the ability to continue with pre-programmed plans even if data con-
nections are lost or communication links are compromised over A2/AD areas.62 But 
increasing UAV autonomy also could accelerate the tempo of conflict, which could 
reduce decision-making time and result in increased human error.
Autonomy poses ethical and legal conundrums as well, 63 particularly if UAVs are de-
veloped that can make the decision — on their own — to fire a weapon without any 
human in the loop for approval.64 For the time being, DoD policy states that no UAV 
will be allowed independently to launch any kind of weapon without human approv-
al.65 However, current DoD directives raise the possibility of permitting the use of such 
autonomous weapons in the future, with the approval of high-ranking military and 
civilian officials.
All these likely future technological developments have the potential to be used both 
for good and for ill, and the time to discuss their potential implications is now — not 
after they are in use.
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Rethinking Export Controls 
Among other things, we will need to reevaluate existing UAV-related export control 
rules. The purpose of UAV export control regimes is to prevent the harmful prolifera-
tion of UAV and missile technology, with a particular focus on limiting foreign access 
to UAV systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD), such as 
nuclear devices or biological and chemical weapons. At the same time, export control 
regulations should not unduly suppress exports or valuable technological innovations. 
A well-planned export control regime can boost the military capability of allied na-
tions, enhance interoperability of military systems among allies, preserve US influence 
over foreign nations’ military UAV programs, and strengthen the domestic US defense 
industrial base economically and technologically. A poorly conceived control system 
will have the opposite effect, suppressing useful innovation, limiting interoperability 
with allies, reducing US influence over foreign UAV development and weakening the 
defense industrial base. At the moment, however, it is unclear whether US export con-
trol rules for UAVs appear well-suited to advancing US national security objectives. As 
noted earlier, the US export control regulations vaguely identify “military” UAVs as 
subject to the stricter controls administered by the US State Department.
Moreover, beyond the regulatory jurisdiction, there are also important questions re-
garding US licensing policy for UAVs. The United States currently applies a “strong 
presumption of denial” for all UAVs that can deliver a payload of at least 500 kilograms 
and that are able to fly more than 300 kilometers. This licensing policy conforms with 
US multilateral commitments for these UAVs, which are considered as “Category I” 
items under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) non-proliferation con-
trols. The MTCR also covers “Category II” UAVs, i.e. complete UAV systems that do 
not fall under Category I and that have a range equal to or greater than 300 km, as well 
as certain other UAVs. The United States reviews Category II UAV licenses on a case-
by-case basis. 
The basic issue is whether US licensing policy is well tailored to US national security 
interests and other policy considerations. For instance, the presumption of denial for 
Category I UAVs maintained by the United States and its MTCR partners (and MTCR 
adherents such as Israel) might enable non-MTCR members to gain global market share, 
reducing US non-proliferation leverage and weakening the US defense industrial base. 
Yet the MTCR limits do not affect the US UAV industry’s access to US Department of 
Defense procurement, which itself is a large fraction of the world market. Moreover, the 
global market may be more focused on smaller, less-capable UAVs, reducing the impact 
of the Category I presumption of denial. 
Conversely, it is possible that US licensing policy should discourage the export of UAVs 
that have capabilities of concern other than the rather simplistic range and payload 
criteria in the MTCR. For example, a fleet of small UAVs (that would fall outside of 
Category I) could have a highly lethal and highly evasive “swarming” capability. Other 
characteristics that may present concerns would be: high rates of speed, robust surveil-
lance payloads, low observable features and anti-aircraft countermeasures. 
28
Recommendations and Report of the Task Force on US Drone Policy
The task force is aware that the administration has been conducting and is nearing 
completion on a detailed review of UAV export controls. We welcome this review, 
which we hope will move the United States toward export control regulations and 
licensing policies that are well tailored to US national security and economic interests.
Targeted Strikes Outside of Traditional Battlefields
The availability of weaponized UAVs almost surely has led US decision-makers to 
adopt counterterrorism tactics that probably would have been deemed too risky or 
politically unacceptable had UAVs not been an option. 
Specifically, if lethal UAVs were not an option, we doubt that the United States would 
have engaged in nearly as many targeted strikes against suspected terrorists in plac-
es such as Pakistan and Yemen.66 In such contexts, airstrikes using manned aircraft 
would generally be viewed as creating an unacceptably high risk of civilian casual-
ties.67 Raids involving US forces on the ground — including special operations forces 
— would create a similar risk of unintended civilian casualties, and would also create 
a risk of significant US casualties. Finally, the relative invisibility of UAVs enables rel-
ative deniability, often a convenience to host nations that are unwilling to appear to 
have welcomed a US military presence inside their territory.
The existence of weaponized UAVs did not “cause” the United States to engage in tar-
geted killings of terror suspects outside of traditional territorially bounded battlefields, 
but it seems reasonable to conclude that their existence enabled a significantly expand-
ed US campaign of targeted cross-border strikes against suspected terrorists.68 Analyst 
Sarah Krebs, a former Air Force acquisitions officer now on the Cornell University 
faculty, noted in April 2014 that “of the estimated 465 non-battlefield targeted killings 
undertaken by the United States since November 2002, approximately 98 percent were 
carried out by drones.”69 The number of US strikes appears to have peaked in 2010 in 
Pakistan and in 2012 in Yemen, but the United States shows no sign of ending the use 
of such strikes. In Yemen, UAV strikes in April 2014 killed an estimated 40 people.70
We believe that this campaign of targeted killings raises numerous questions, some 
strategic, some legal and ethical. 
Lethal UAVs, Targeted Strikes and Strategic Risk
Strategically, we are concerned that the administration’s heavy reliance on targeted 
killings as a pillar of US counterterrorism strategy rests on questionable assumptions 
and risks increasing instability and escalating conflicts.
In certain circumstances, targeted strikes against particular individuals may have 
enormous strategic value. This is particularly likely to be true when the individuals in 
question possess and are likely to utilize unique knowledge and skills, whether those 
skills are technical or organizational in nature. At times, strikes against key terrorist 
operatives and agents might be critical to preventing an imminent attack; similarly, in 
some circumstances killing specified individuals may have a deterrent or demoralizing 
effect on other operatives or potential recruits.
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But while tactical strikes may have helped keep the homeland free of major terrorist 
attacks, existing evidence indicates that both Sunni and Shia Islamic extremist groups 
have grown in scope, lethality and influence in the broader area of operations in the 
Middle East, Africa and South Asia. Prior to 9/11 such extremist groups operated in a 
generally confined geographic area near the Afghanistan/Pakistan border area. Today, 
such groups operate from Nigeria to Mali, to Libya, to the Sinai, to Syria, to Iraq, to 
Pakistan, Afghanistan and beyond, and there is no indication that a US strategy to 
destroy al-Qaida has curbed the rise of Sunni Islamic extremism, deterred the estab-
lishment of Shia Islamic extremist groups or advanced long-term US security interests.
The use of targeted UAV strikes to gain tactical advantage has led to some success-
es in various geographic areas of operations, but evidence about the scope, number, 
and lethality of terrorist attacks worldwide suggest that al-Qaida elements still have 
a broad reach and, potentially, a decades-long lifespan. These weapons will be part 
of that struggle, but they will not defeat the broader strategic threat. In fact, evidence 
suggests that the broader strategic struggle against terrorist entities is not succeeding.71 
Furthermore, US targeted strikes also create new strategic risks. These include:
Possible Erosion of the Norm of Sovereignty 
The growing use of UAVs outside of hot battlefields may erode the norm of state sover-
eignty in ways ultimately harmful to US interests. While the US use of manned aircraft 
or special operations raids would also raise sovereignty concerns if used for cross-bor-
der targeted killings, the relative greater frequency of US UAV strikes72 increases the 
odds that a foreign state or elements within it will consider its sovereignty to have been 
infringed upon. 73
Currently, US UAV strikes in Pakistan and Yemen appear to have been carried out 
with the actual or tacit consent of those states’ governments,74 but that consent appears 
somewhat ambiguous. In the case of Pakistan, for instance, both parliament and the 
courts75 have declared US UAV strikes unlawful violations of Pakistan sovereignty, 
a sentiment that has been echoed by some executive branch representatives,76 even 
as other Pakistani executive branch officials continue to offer intermittent coopera-
tion with US strikes. In the case of Yemen, many Yemenis feel that the president, Abd 
Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, who approved US UAV strikes, does not represent the views of 
the population. 
The US government takes the view that it has a legal right to use force in the terri-
tories of foreign sovereign states when those states are “unwilling or unable” to take 
what the United States considers appropriate action to eliminate what it sees as immi-
nent threats. But inevitably, assessments of what constitutes an imminent threat to the 
United States and what would constitute appropriate action are somewhat subjective in 
nature; the United States may view the use of force as justified even when US allies and 
partners do not. The US use of force in sovereign nations whose consent is question-
able or nonexistent may encourage other states to follow suit with their own military 
platforms or even commercial entities.77
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Blowback 
Civilian casualties, even if relatively few, can anger whole communities, increase 
anti-US sentiment and become a potent recruiting tool for terrorist organizations.78 
Even strikes that kill only terrorist operatives can cause great resentment, particu-
larly in contexts in which terrorist recruiting efforts rely on tribal loyalties or on an 
economically desperate population. 
Friends, family and fellow tribe members of those attacked or harmed in strikes may 
become hostile to the United States, and, over years, their hostility may cost the United 
States in terms of foreign cooperation, hostility to US travelers and foreign business 
and support for terrorism. UAV “hunter-killer” operations may also go against the 
larger counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy of attempting to gain support 
of local populations to deter them from supporting al-Qaida and associated forces.79 
Even where strikes kill only legitimate targets, the perceived insult to sovereignty — in 
places such as Pakistan and Yemen and among fellow tribe members of the dead — 
sparks bitterness, feelings of nationalism or other forms of identity politics violently 
hostile to US military operations or Americans.80
As retired Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, former International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) commander in Afghanistan, has noted, “The resentment created by 
American use of unmanned strikes ... is much greater than the average American ap-
preciates. They are hated on a visceral level, even by people who’ve never seen one or 
seen the effects of one.” The unmanned strikes, McChrystal says, create a “perception 
of American arrogance that says, ‘Well we can fly where we want, we can shoot where 
we want, because we can.’ ”81
UAV strikes by the United States have also generated a backlash in countries not di-
rectly affected by the strikes, in part due to the perception that such strikes cause ex-
cessive civilian deaths, and in part due to concerns about sovereignty, transparency, 
accountability and other human rights and rule of law issues. (These are discussed 
more fully below.) In February 2014, for instance, the European Parliament voted 534-
49 for a resolution condemning US drone strikes, asserting that “thousands of civilians 
have reportedly been killed or seriously injured by drone strikes [but] these figures are 
difficult to estimate, owing to lack of transparency and obstacles to effective inves-
tigation.”82 The resolution went on to call for EU member states to “oppose and ban 
the practice of extrajudicial targeted killings [and] ensure that the member states, in 
conformity with their legal obligations, do not perpetrate unlawful targeted killings or 
facilitate such killings by other states.”83
National officials, parliamentarians and thought leaders in numerous allied countries 
and at the United Nations have questioned or condemned US targeted strikes.84 While 
US officials may take the view that such criticisms are based on erroneous information 
or an incorrect reading of the applicable law, the fact remains that when allies and part-
ners do not support US policies, we pay a price. The price may be direct — allies may be 
unwilling to share intelligence data crucial to targeting, for instance, for fear of incurring 
legal liability in their own courts or for fear of domestic political consequences — or it 
may be indirect — anger at US targeted strikes may translate into lower levels of co-
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operation with unrelated US diplomatic initiatives. Either way, the risk of international 
backlash against US strikes needs to be factored in as we evaluate the strategic value of 
targeted strikes.
Slippery Slope
The increasing use of lethal UAVs may create a slippery slope leading to continual or 
wider wars. The seemingly low-risk and low-cost missions enabled by UAV technolo-
gies may encourage the United States to fly such missions more often, pursuing targets 
with UAVs that would be deemed not worth pursuing if manned aircraft or special 
operations forces had to be put at risk. For similar reasons, however, adversarial states 
may be quicker to use force against American UAVs than against US manned aircraft 
or military personnel: shooting down an unmanned airframe may not carry the same 
implications, either in terms of other states’ domestic politics or in terms of foreign 
relations, which might make other nations more willing to shoot down US UAVs, in-
creasing the risk of tit-for-tat escalation.85
UAVs also create an escalation risk insofar as they may lower the bar to enter a conflict, 
without increasing the likelihood of a satisfactory outcome. For example, the terrorists 
that US UAVs tend to be used to hunt are often mostly motivated by localized conflicts 
occurring in states with fractured political orders. The use of UAVs to track and kill 
such individuals does not repair the political rifts that give rise to terrorist violence. 
If US targeted killing campaigns fail to eradicate all threats of extremism, this may 
create a perceived policy failure. This, in turn, may create domestic political pressures 
to continue or escalate the use of lethal force, leading US UAV hunter-killer missions 
to continue indefinitely. 
The US use of lethal UAVs for targeted strikes outside of hot battlefields is likely to be 
imitated by other states as well. While the United States enjoys temporary dominance 
in its ability to deploy lethal UAVs effectively — which can be effective in part because 
of the United States’ broader and more integrated ISR capabilities — other states are 
catching up, and may soon find themselves tempted to deploy lethal UAVs in similar 
fashion. Such potential future increase in the use of lethal UAV strikes by foreign states 
may cause or increase instability, and may increase further the risk of widening con-
flicts in regions around the globe.
In recent years, US targeted strikes involving UAVs have gone from a relative rarity to 
a relatively common practice in Pakistan and Yemen. As the number of strikes increas-
es, so too does the strategic risk.
To the best of our knowledge, however, the US executive branch has yet to engage in a sys-
tematic cost-benefit analysis of targeted UAV strikes as a routine counterterrorism tool.86 
There are numerous non-kinetic means of combatting terrorism; some of these —e.g., 
efforts to disrupt terrorist communications and finances — can easily be combined with 
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targeted strikes, while others — e.g., efforts to build friendly relationships with local com-
munities and inspire cooperation — may not be combined as easily. 
A serious counterterrorism strategy needs to consider carefully, and reassess constant-
ly, the balance between kinetic action and other counterterrorism tools, and the poten-
tial unintended consequences of increased reliance on lethal UAVs, including erosion 
of sovereignty norms, blowback and the possibility of prolonging or escalating conflict 
and instability. 87
Legal and Ethical Issues Connected to Targeted Lethal UAV Strikes
Transparency
Media and NGO reports have documented numerous UAV strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, 
Somalia and elsewhere, and administration officials have discussed in broad outline 
the targeting process and the legal theory that underlies cross-border targeted kill-
ings. But the administration has disclosed details relating to only a handful of targeted 
strikes against American citizens: for the most part, the identities of those targeted 
and the basis for their targeting have not been disclosed.88 Details relating to incidents 
that may have involved civilian casualties also have not been disclosed. In court filings, 
the administration continues to state that it will neither confirm nor deny particular 
strikes, or even the existence of such strikes as a general matter. 
While administration officials have made an effort to address public concerns by more 
fully explaining the logic and legal theories behind targeted strikes,89 it remains dif-
ficult to know precisely how frequently there are targeted killings by UAVs, who has 
been targeted, where the strikes occur, whether targeting decisions have been made 
appropriately, how many civilians have been killed, and so on. 
We recognize that US officials frequently have compelling reasons to refrain from pro-
viding some of this information to the public. Disclosing the evidence that led to the 
targeting of a particular individual might expose intelligence capabilities that are ef-
fective only if secret; in some circumstances, disclosure might jeopardize the safety of 
human intelligence assets. Naming potential targets or targeted organizations creates a 
risk that those individuals or organizations will go “underground” even as they contin-
ue to plan terror attacks, making prevention of future attacks more difficult. Disclosing 
past strikes may also anger, and prevent future cooperation from, countries that have 
agreed to strikes only on condition that US activities in their territory remain secret. 
We believe that US government decision-makers make targeting decisions in good 
faith and with genuine care. All of us on this task force have worked inside the ex-
ecutive branch and have great respect for the integrity and thoughtfulness of the in-
dividuals connected with targeted strike decisions, from the president down to the 
men and women piloting weaponized UAVs. Indeed, we are inclined to believe that 
the majority of those targeted by US UAV strikes are individuals who could be widely 
acknowledged as legitimate targets if the information relating to their targeting were 
made public. Nonetheless, we are concerned by the continuing lack of transparency 
relating to US targeted killings.
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It is important to note that targeted strikes outside of “hot battlefields” are carried 
out both by the military and by the CIA.90 While the United States has not formally 
acknowledged most such strikes by either agency,91 far more is known publicly about 
the targeting procedures for military strikes than for CIA strikes. 
The Department of Defense has a robust procedure for targeting, with outlined au-
thorities and steps, and clear checks on individual targets. The authorization of a UAV 
strike by the military follows the traditional process in place for all weapons systems 
(be they MQ-9 Reaper drones or F-16 fighter jets). Regardless of whether particular 
strikes are acknowledged, the Pentagon has stated that UAV strikes, like strikes from 
manned aircraft, are subject to the military’s pre-strike target development procedures 
and post-strike assessment. 
The process of determining and executing a strike follows a specific set of steps to 
ensure fidelity in target selection, strike and post-strike review.92 The first step, target 
development, involves four stages: target analysis, vetting, validation and nomination. 
By creating a cross-agency and cross-service vetting process, the target development 
procedure ensures that 1) the target achieves the objectives and goals dictated by the 
force commander, and 2) a targeted strike does not conflict with the goals or objectives 
of other services or agencies. 
Following each strike, a post-strike review is carried out both at the tactical level (with 
input from the unit) and at the operational level — in order to determine whether the 
target was carried out in line with rules of engagement and how the strike’s success 
or failure fits into the larger operational strategy. The chain of command within the 
military process is well defined, and helps ensure proper accountability. Ultimately, 
the commander has authority and accountability for the strike, but is assisted at all 
steps in the targeting process by judge advocate general lawyers (JAGs). JAGs provide 
legal advice on the proper rules of engagement, including those in connection with any 
mission changes during the operation.
Under Title 50 of the United States Code, CIA strikes and the process for determining 
targets are kept out of the public eye. As a result, it is difficult to discern whether the 
CIA follows similar rules and procedures when targeting. Press reports, based on leaks 
from administration officials, suggest that the CIA allows for more rapid and efficient 
targeting than the military — including an ability to react to imminent threats without 
the burden of multi-service and multi-agency oversight. But this more rapid process 
may run the risk of reducing needed internal checks and balances. While administra-
tion officials suggest there is an extensive review process for CIA strikes, it remains un-
clear who is involved in the process, which agencies and departments provide checks 
and oversights, how the chain of command works, and, in terms of accountability, who 
ultimately is responsible for the strikes.
Law Versus the Rule of Law
From a US government perspective, the United States is in an ongoing armed conflict 
with al-Qaida and its “associated forces.” 
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As a domestic law matter, the use of lethal force against al-Qaida was authorized by the 
2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed by Congress a few 
days after the 9/11 attacks. The AUMF placed no geographic or temporal limitations on 
the use of force; it states only that the president may use “all necessary and appropriate 
force against those nations, organizations or persons he determines planned, autho-
rized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on Sept. 11, 2001.”93 The 
Obama administration has interpreted this broadly, arguing that the AUMF should 
be read to authorize the use of force against not only al-Qaida and the Taliban, but 
against any organizations or persons it views as “associated forces” of al-Qaida, even 
if those “associated” groups or individuals had no connection to the 9/11 attacks and 
pose no direct threat to the United States. On this apparent basis, the administration 
has justified targeted strikes against al-Shabab militants in Somalia, as well as assorted 
militants in Pakistan and Yemen.94
As an international law matter, the existence of an armed conflict between the United 
States and al-Qaida triggers the applicability of the law of armed conflict, which per-
mits the United States to target al-Qaida operatives as enemy combatants. The law of 
armed conflict permits status-based targeting: that is, al-Qaida combatants are targe-
table because of who they are, not because of their activities. By extension, members of 
organizations that fight alongside al-Qaida are also targetable as co-belligerents. And 
unlike ordinary domestic law or international human rights law, the law of armed 
conflict does not require the United States to provide due process to enemy combatants 
before targeting them, and it does not require the United States to compensate enemy 
combatants or their families for injuries, deaths or property damage. 
Beyond the law of armed conflict, international law also recognizes that states have the 
right to use armed force outside their own borders when doing so is necessary to pre-
vent an imminent attack.95 US officials therefore have argued that cross-border target-
ed strikes against terror suspects are permitted both under the law of armed conflict 
and under the international law of self-defense.
These are plausible interpretations of existing US and international law, and we dis-
agree with those critics who have declared that US targeted killings are “illegal.” But 
“legality” and “the rule of law” are not the same thing. Changing technologies and 
events have made it increasingly difficult to apply the law of armed conflict and the 
international law relating to the use of force in a consistent and principled manner, 
leading to divergence between “the law” and the core rule of law principles that tradi-
tionally have animated US policy.
The law of armed conflict and the international legal rules governing the use of force 
by states arose in an era far removed from our own. When the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 were drafted, for instance, it was assumed that most conflicts would be between 
states with uniformed, hierarchically organized militaries, and that the temporal and 
geographic boundaries of armed conflicts would be clear. 
The paradigmatic armed conflict was presumed to have a clear beginning (a decla-
ration of war) and a clear end (the surrender of one party, or a peace treaty); it was 
also presumed the armed conflict to be confined geographically to specific, identifi-
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able states and territories. What’s more, the law of armed conflict presumes that it is a 
relatively straightforward matter to identify “combatants” and distinguish them from 
“civilians,” who are not targetable unless they participate directly in hostilities. The 
assumption is that it is also a straightforward matter to define “direct participation in 
hostilities.”
The notion of “imminent attack” at the heart of international law rules relating to the 
use of force in state self-defense was similarly construed narrowly: traditionally, “im-
minent” was understood to mean “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of 
means, and no moment for deliberation.”96
But the rise of transnational non-state terrorist organizations confounds these preex-
isting legal categories. The armed conflict with al-Qaida and its associated forces can, 
by definition, have no set geographical boundaries, because al-Qaida and its associates 
are not territorially based and move easily across state borders. The conflict also has no 
temporal boundaries — not simply because we do not know the precise date on which 
the conflict will end, but because there is no obvious means of determining the “end” 
of an armed conflict with an inchoate, non-hierarchical network. 
In a conflict so sporadic and protean — a conflict with enemies who wear no uniforms, 
operate in secret and may not use traditional “weapons” — the process of determining 
where and when the law of armed conflict applies, who should be considered a com-
batant and what counts as “hostilities” inevitably is fraught with difficulty. While our 
military and intelligence communities have grown increasingly adept, both at iden-
tifying and confirming the identities of al-Qaida affiliates and at precise and careful 
targeting, the criteria used to determine who might be considered targetable remain 
unknown to the public. 
As it becomes increasingly difficult to articulate a consistent or principled definition 
of “combatant” or “hostilities,” it also becomes similarly difficult to determine the cir-
cumstances in which a civilian becomes targetable because he is “participating directly 
in hostilities.” In addition, it is unclear what standards should be used for determining 
what organizations might constitute “associated forces” or “co-belligerents” that “fight 
alongside” al-Qaida.97 Finally, it is difficult to understand how the US government de-
termines the “imminence” of unknown types of future attacks being planned by un-
known individuals. 
Reliance on intelligence and other targeting information provided by a host nation gov-
ernment adds an extra layer of uncertainty. In such contexts — when it is already so 
difficult to articulate clear criteria for determining what law applies, and to whom — we 
face the additional challenge of ensuring that we are not being drawn into a civil war, or 
being used to target the domestic political enemies of the host state leadership. 
While the legal norms governing armed conflicts and the use of force look clear on 
paper, the changing nature of modern conflicts and security threats has rendered them 
almost incoherent in practice. Basic categories such as “battlefield,” “combatant” and 
“hostilities” no longer have a clear or stable meaning. And when this happens, the rule 
of law is threatened.98
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A great deal of ink has been spilled in efforts to define “the rule of law.” For present pur-
poses, it is probably sufficient to use the definition adopted by the US Army:
“Rule of law is a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions 
and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable 
to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independent-
ly adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights 
principles.”99 
The Army’s Rule of Law Handbook adds that the rule of law further requires that
• Individuals are secure in their persons and property;
• The state is itself bound by law and does not act arbitrarily;
• The law can be readily determined and is stable enough to allow individuals to 
plan their affairs;
• Individuals have meaningful access to an effective and impartial legal system; and
• The state protects basic human rights and fundamental freedoms.100
The United States was founded upon rule of law principles,101 and historically has 
sought to ensure that its own actions, international law and the actions of foreign states 
are consistent with these principles. Today, however, despite the undoubted good faith 
of US decision-makers, it would be difficult to conclude that US targeted strikes are 
consistent with core rule of law norms. 
Consider US targeted strikes from the perspective of individuals in — for instance — 
Pakistan or Yemen. From the perspective of a Yemeni villager or a Pakistani living in 
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), life is far from secure. Death can 
come from the sky at any moment, and the instability and incoherence of existing le-
gal categories means that there is no way for an individual to be certain whether he is 
considered targetable by the United States. (Would attending a meeting or community 
gathering also attended by an al-Qaida member make him targetable? Would renting 
a building or selling a vehicle to a member of an “associated” force render him targe-
table? What counts as an “associated force?” Would accepting financial or medical aid 
from a terrorist group make him a target? Would extending hospitality to a relative 
who is affiliated with a terrorist group lead the United States to consider him a target?) 
From the perspective of those living in regions that have been affected by US UAV 
strikes, this uncertainty makes planning impossible, and makes US strikes appear ar-
bitrary. What’s more, individuals in states such as Pakistan or Yemen have no ability to 
seek clarification of the law or their status from an effective or impartial legal system, 
no ability to argue that they have been mistakenly or inappropriately targeted or that 
the intelligence that led to their inclusion on a “kill list” was flawed or fabricated, and 
no ability to seek redress for injury. Their national laws and courts can offer no assis-
tance in the face of foreign power, and far from protecting their fundamental rights 
and freedoms, their own states may in fact be deceiving them about their knowledge 
of and cooperation with US strikes. Meanwhile, geography and finances make it im-
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possible to access US courts, and a variety of legal barriers — such as the state secrets 
privilege, the political question doctrine, and issues of standing, ripeness and moot-
ness — in any case would prevent meaningful access to justice.102
International Precedents
As noted earlier, we believe that the US officials involved in targeted strike decisions 
are acting in good faith and with appropriate care. Nonetheless, we must consider how 
US targeted strikes appear to those outside the US executive branch — and particularly 
to those who live in other parts of the world.
From the perspective of many around the world, the United States currently appears 
to claim, in effect, the legal right to kill any person it determines is a member of al-Qa-
ida or its associated forces, in any state on Earth, at any time, based on secret criteria 
and secret evidence, evaluated in a secret process by unknown and largely anonymous 
individuals — with no public disclosure of which organizations are considered “asso-
ciated forces” (or how combatant status is determined, how the United States defines 
“participation in hostilities”), no means for anyone outside that secret process to raise 
questions about the criteria or validity of the evidence, and no means for anyone out-
side that process to identify or remedy mistakes or abuses. As we have noted, these rule 
of law concerns have led to significant international criticism of US targeted strikes.103 
But US practices also set a dangerous precedent that may be seized upon by other 
states — not all of which are likely to behave as scrupulously as US officials.104 Imagine, 
for instance, if Russia began to use UAV strikes to kill individuals opposed to its an-
nexation of Crimea and its growing influence in Eastern Ukraine. Even if the United 
States strongly believed those targeted by Russian were all nonviolent political activists 
lawfully expressing their opinions, Russia could easily take a page out of the United 
States’ book and assert that the targeted individuals were members of anti-Russian 
terrorist groups with which Russia is in an armed conflict. Pressed for evidence, Russia 
could simply repeat the words used by US officials defending US targeted killings, as-
serting that it could not provide any evidence without disclosing sources and methods 
and creating a risk that terrorists would go underground. In such circumstances, how 
could the United States credibly condemn Russian targeted killings? 
As noted earlier, US targeted strikes using lethal UAV technologies create strategic 
risks, including those associated with the erosion of norms of sovereignty and the pos-
sibility that other states will echo US arguments and engage in potentially destabiliz-
ing targeted strikes of their own. From the perspective of international rule of law and 
human rights, the same risks apply: is the United States inadvertently handing abusive 
foreign regimes a playbook for murdering those it considers politically inconvenient, 
under the guise of combating terrorism?
Democratic Accountability
Increased US reliance on lethal UAVs in cross-border targeted strikes also poses chal-
lenges to democracy and the American system of checks and balances. While we un-
derstand the administration’s reasons for considering additional transparency diffi-
cult, the effect of the lack of transparency is that the United States has been fighting 
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what amounts to a covert, multi-year killing program. But without additional infor-
mation about the locations and frequency of UAV targeted strikes; without informa-
tion about the numbers and identities of those killed and injured; without information 
even about the budgetary implications of covert targeted strikes: how can the citizenry 
evaluate US targeted strikes? 
UAV strikes also raise questions about the continued efficacy of traditional congressio-
nal oversight mechanisms. Because UAV strikes do not require placing US troops into 
combat situations — and because such strikes may be sporadic — the administration 
has asserted that it is not required to notify the full Congress of targeted strikes or seek 
congressional authorization. 105 At the moment, the Obama administration continues 
to rely on the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force as the primary domestic 
legal basis for US targeted strikes outside of “hot” battlefields. But as noted earlier, the 
administration’s interpretation of the AUMF is extraordinarily broad, and even many 
former executive branch officials question whether Congress intended to authorize 
such an unbounded conflict when the AUMF was passed in 2001.106
The covert or unacknowledged nature of most UAV targeted strikes also makes it dif-
ficult for Congress to perform its vital oversight functions. CIA UAV strikes constitute 
“covert action” under US law, which defines “covert action” as any “activity or activities 
of the United States government to influence political, economic or military conditions 
abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States government will not be 
apparent or acknowledged publicly.”107 The CIA requires a presidential “finding” to au-
thorize covert action, and if such presidential authorization is received, the CIA need 
not give prior notice of particular covert operations to any members of Congress ex-
cept the so-called “Gang of Eight.” (the chairman and ranking members of the Senate 
and House Intelligence committees, the speaker and minority leader of the House and 
the majority and minority leaders of the Senate). After a covert action, the executive 
branch is required to notify the full intelligence committees, but not the full Congress. 
Technically, the US military is not permitted to engage in “covert action” as defined by 
law. It is important to emphasize, however, that the military is not prohibited from engag-
ing in secret, unacknowledged activities that are intended to remain unacknowledged, 
for US law states that “traditional military activities” do not constitute “covert action.”108 
While “traditional military activities” are not defined by law, the conference report 
accompanying the covert action statute commented, “It is the intent of the conferees 
that ‘traditional military activities’ include activities by military personnel under the 
direction and control of a United States military commander (whether or not the US 
sponsorship of such activities is apparent or later to be acknowledged) preceding and 
related to hostilities which are either anticipated (meaning approval has been given by 
the National Command Authorities for the activities and/or operational planning for 
hostilities) to involve US military forces, or where such hostilities involving United 
States military forces are ongoing, and, where the fact of the US role in the overall op-
eration is apparent or to be acknowledged publicly.”109
Since the United States regards itself as in an acknowledged armed conflict with al-Qa-
ida and its associates, this means, in effect, that the military may, consistent with cur-
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rent US law, carry out secret, unacknowledged strikes against those it believes to be 
members of al-Qaida and its “associated forces” without technically violating the legal 
prohibition on covert military activities. 
From the perspective of laypersons, both the CIA and the military can thus engage in 
covert strikes in the colloquial sense of the term. But while covert action undertaken 
by the CIA requires a presidential finding and notification — even if after the fact — of 
the congressional intelligence committees, secret, unacknowledged strikes carried out 
by the US military need not be reported to the intelligence committees, as the military 
reports instead to the House and Senate Armed Services committees. 
At best, this fragmented oversight system creates confusion and a danger that critical 
issues may slip through the cracks. As a recent Council on Foreign Relations brief 
notes, “Sometimes oversight is duplicated among the committees; at other times, there 
is confusion over who is mandated to oversee which operations.” 110 This fragmented 
oversight system is particularly problematic given that, in practice, the military and 
CIA generally work together quite closely when planning and engaging in targeted 
UAV strikes: few strikes are “all military” or “all CIA.” The differing CIA and military 
reporting requirements create a risk of executive branch “forum shopping,” tempting 
the executive branch to place a given targeted strike under the direction and control of 
whichever entity is deemed to have the most accommodating committee members.111 
Recent congressional efforts to address these issues have been unavailing. In February 
2014, for instance, Sen. Carl Levin, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee 
(SASC), sought to hold a joint classified hearing with the Senate Intelligence Committee 
at which both CIA and military officials would appear simultaneously to discuss CIA 
and military UAV strikes. The White House refused to provide the SASC members 
with the security clearances needed to be briefed on CIA programs, however.112
Even leaving aside the division of oversight authority between the intelligence and 
armed services committees, it is unclear how effective existing oversight mechanisms 
are for either the CIA or the military. Critics of intelligence committee oversight note 
that committee members may receive only oral briefings on particularly sensitive 
“controlled access programs,”113 making meaningful scrutiny impossible. Meanwhile, 
on the military side, until 2013 there was no statutory requirement that these commit-
tees be notified of all targeted strikes. 
In 2013, Congress passed the Oversight of Sensitive Military Operations Act (OSMOA) 
as part of the National Defense Authorization Act.114 OSMOA required the Pentagon to 
notify the House and Senate Armed Services committees following every military tar-
geted strike outside of Afghanistan, and required DoD to develop a system to ensure 
compliance with this requirement. OSMOA also required DoD to report to the Armed 
Services committees within 60 days to provide “an explanation of the legal and policy 
considerations and approval processes used in determining whether an individual or 
group of individuals could be the target of a lethal operation or capture operation con-
ducted by the Armed Forces of the United States.”115 
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The Pentagon has not complied fully with OSMOA, however, and the chairman’s mark-
up for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 contains language 
that, if enacted into law, would “prohibit the obligation or expenditure of 25 percent 
of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this act or otherwise available for fiscal 
year 2015 for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations 
and Low Intensity Conflict until the congressional defense committees receive the pro-
cedures required by section 130f(b)(1) of Title 10, United States Code, and the report 
required by section 1043 of the National Defense Authorization for Fiscal Year 2014 
(Public Law 113-66).”116
Even when the appropriate congressional committees are fully briefed, the classi-
fied nature of targeted strikes, whether CIA or military, makes oversight a challenge. 
Because the information involved is classified, members of Congress may have only 
limited ability to object in a meaningful way: they may be unable to share vital details 
with colleagues not on relevant committees, and they may lack the authority to share 
details or criticisms with constituents. But secret policies that have not been scruti-
nized are more likely to be ill-conceived,117 and the congressional deference more or 
less forced by lack of information may become a habit that continues, even when more 
consequential uses of force are under consideration.118
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On May 23, 2013, President Obama delivered a major speech at the National Defense 
University in which he acknowledged many of the same concerns addressed in this 
report. In his speech, he pledged to continue the difficult task of ensuring that the use 
of lethal UAVs is both strategically sound and consistent with long-standing US com-
mitments to democracy, accountability and the rule of law. 
This report represents a preliminary effort to respond to the president’s call for con-
structive new approaches to thinking about UAVs. The foregoing analysis highlights 
the questions and concerns we view as most pressing. This section contains detailed 
recommendations for overhauling UAV strategy; improving oversight, accountability 
and transparency; developing forward-looking international norms relating to the use 
of lethal force in nontraditional settings; and devising sound UAV export control and 
research and development policies.
UAV technologies are here to stay. Used foolishly, they can endanger our interests, 
diminish regional and global stability and undermine our values. Used wisely, they 
can help advance our national security interests even as we foster a more robust inter-
national commitment to the rule of law. 
We believe this report offers a useful framework for ensuring that the United States 
uses these new technologies wisely, and we look forward to discussing our recommen-
dations with the administration and the public.
1. Conduct a strategic review of the role of lethal UAVs in targeted 
counterterrorism strikes.
The US government should conduct a thoroughgoing interagency strategic review of the 
use of UAVs in targeted counterterrorism strikes. At a minimum, the review should: 
• Evaluate the impact of past UAV strikes on terrorist organizations, with regard to 
capabilities, threats currently posed, morale and recruiting. 
• Evaluate the impact of such strikes on affected communities including attitudes 
toward their own governments, toward the United States, toward the West, to-
ward al-Qaida’s ideology and toward terrorist organizations. 
• Evaluate the impact of such strikes on public opinion, litigation, defense policy 
and government cooperation in allies and partner nations. 
• Evaluate rigorously the costs and benefits both of specific strikes and of kinetic 
versus non-kinetic means of combatting terrorism on a country-by-country, re-
gion-by-region basis. 
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• Lay out guidelines, consistent with broader US government counterterrorism 
strategy, for determination of when targeted strikes are appropriate, and for on-
going reassessment of the strikes’ effects and value.
We urge the president to order such a review with a clear timeframe for completion 
and a commitment to provide the full Congress with a thorough report on the strategic 
review, as well as an unclassified report to the American public (see also recommen-
dation 4, below).
If the president does not make such a commitment, we urge Congress to mandate such 
a review and reporting process. 
This review and reporting process should supplement, not substitute for, an indepen-
dent review as outlined in recommendation 4, below.
2. Improve transparency in targeted UAV strikes.
As a general principle, the United States should acknowledge the use of lethal force in 
foreign countries both to Congress and to the American public. While secrecy may be 
required before and during each strike, strikes should generally be acknowledged by 
the United States after the fact. We do not believe it is consistent with American values 
for the United States to carry on a broad, multi-year program of targeted strikes in 
which the United States has acknowledged only the deaths of four US citizens, despite 
clear evidence that several thousand others have also been killed.
• The United States should, as a matter of general policy, refrain from promising 
foreign governments that it will keep secret its own use of lethal force. 
° There may be occasional circumstances in which strikes must be covert 
and/or unacknowledged, but covert or unacknowledged strikes should 
be the rare exception, not the rule. 
° If circumstances require the covert/unattributed use of lethal force, 
strikes should be acknowledged as soon as possible after the circum-
stances requiring secrecy have passed. 
■ The default rule should be prompt acknowledgment, absent extraor-
dinarily compelling reasons for continued secrecy, and the burden 
should be on those advocating continued secrecy to demonstrate 
its necessity, taking into account the numerous costs of continued 
secrecy. 
■ Decisions not to acknowledge the use of lethal force should be re-
viewed at least annually to ensure that the use of force does not 
remain classified out of habit rather than necessity. 
• Regardless of whether any particular strike is acknowledged, the president should 
release to the public an unclassified version of the interagency report resulting from 
the strategic review and cost-benefit analysis as outlined in recommendation 1.
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° The unclassified report should, to the fullest extent possible, release in-
formation on:
■ The approximate number and general location of targeted UAV 
strikes;
■ The number of individuals known to have been killed; 
■ The organizational affiliations of those individuals;
■ The number and identities of any civilians known to be killed; and
■ The approximate number of strikes carried out by the military ver-
sus the CIA.
• The president should order the preparation and public release of a detailed report 
explaining the legal basis under domestic and international law for US conduct of 
targeted killings. The report should go beyond speeches by administration offi-
cials. Although the task force respects the need for the executive branch to protect 
internal legal advice, the United States should not conduct a long-term killing 
program based on secret rationales.
3. Transfer general responsibility for carrying out lethal UAV strikes 
from the CIA to the military.
• Parallel CIA and military UAV programs are, at best, duplicative and inefficient. 
At worst, the existence of parallel programs makes oversight more difficult and 
increases the risk of error and arbitrariness, since the CIA and military may have 
different standards for evaluating intelligence and identifying appropriate targets. 
• The United States should have a single integrated system for carrying out lethal 
targeted strikes outside hot battlefields, perhaps utilizing a dedicated, military-led 
“fusion center” model to ensure that military operators have access to real-time 
intelligence information and support. The CIA should provide the military with 
intelligence and analysis to aid in targeting decisions, but UAV strikes themselves 
should take place under the command and control of the military. 
• While rare exceptions may be warranted, as a general principle, the military 
should be the entity responsible for the use of lethal force outside the United 
States, while the CIA should focus on intelligence collection and analysis. 
4. Develop more robust oversight and accountability mechanisms for 
targeted strikes outside of hot battlefields.
• While internal executive branch reviews and reports are important, public and 
international concerns about targeted strikes will not be alleviated fully through 
such mechanisms. 
° The task force recommends that the president, by executive order, create 
a nonpartisan independent commission to review lethal UAV policy. 
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The commission might be modeled after the Presidential Intelligence 
Advisory Board, the Robb-Silberman Commission on Iraq WMD, the 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, or similar commissions.
° Members of this independent commission should be selected with a 
view to ensuring credibility and diversity of background. 
■ Members should be respected individuals with experience in the 
military community, the intelligence community, the diplomatic 
community, the legal community and the human rights commu-
nity, along with regional experts and retired policymakers and 
legislators. 
° The commission should not be directly involved in the pre-strike ap-
proval process. It should instead be tasked with:
■ Reviewing the overall policy and approval process for the use of 
lethal UAV strikes (both military and CIA) to ensure compliance 
with the law and with American values and our national commit-
ment to upholding and promoting the rule of law;
■ Reviewing particular past lethal strikes and targeting decisions, 
selected at the commission’s discretion, to assess their conformity 
with existing US law, policy and process, their effectiveness, any 
civilian deaths caused by the strike/s, and their impact on US inter-
ests in the region and globally; 
■ Recommending policies and procedures for correcting any past 
mistakes and for developing safeguards against potential future 
mistakes or abuses;
■ Recommending a means of providing compensation or solatia 
(sympathy) payments, if appropriate, to the families of any civil-
ians killed in drone strikes, and for damage to civilian property or 
injuries to civilians;
■ Making any other recommendations the commission views as ap-
propriate to ensure that the US use of lethal UAVs complies both 
with US law and with our national commitment to upholding the 
rule of law and ensuring accountability and transparency in the use 
of lethal force abroad; and
■ Ensuring that targeted killings, whether carried out by UAV strikes 
or other instruments of lethal force, including force used during US 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) raids, are having a positive effect 
on US national security and not trading short-term gains for more 
negative longer-term strategic consequences. (That, in the presi-
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dent’s words, we do not “create more enemies than we take off the 
battlefield.”119)
° The commission should be designed to ensure maximum insulation 
from partisan or political pressures. 
■ Commission members should receive all appropriate security 
clearances and should serve for set periods of time;
■ The commission should have the power to inspect government 
documents at its discretion and interview government officials;
■ The commission should have a staff and budget sufficient to enable 
it to carry out the foregoing duties.
° The Commission should report at least annually to the president and to 
the armed services and intelligence committees in Congress, making 
interim reports as the commission considers appropriate.
■ The president should have the right to review commission reports 
to Congress in advance, solely for the purpose of removing infor-
mation related to intelligence sources and methods and other mat-
ters that are legitimately protected by executive privilege. 
■ An unclassified version of the commission’s annual report to the 
president and Congress should be released publicly.
5. Foster the development of appropriate international norms for the 
use of lethal force outside traditional battlefields.
• Technological, social and political changes will continue to give rise to new 
kinds of national security threats and new kinds of conflicts. While conflict 
between nation-states remains a frightening possibility, the United States and 
other countries increasingly will find themselves in conflicts with non-state ac-
tors, and these conflicts will often occupy the murky ground between crime 
and full-scale war in the traditional sense. At the moment, however, such con-
flicts do not fit easily into existing legal categories, making the use of lethal 
force in such conflicts controversial. 
• Thus far, the United States has done little to explain its use of lethal UAV strikes 
to partners or allies, and has largely resisted calls from allies and international 
organizations to provide more information on UAV strikes or the legal views 
and policy approaches underlying them. This reticence needlessly damages 
America’s reputation, and increases the danger that irresponsible states will 
seize on US actions as precedent for engaging in what the United States would 
view as unjustified strikes.
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• The United States should take the lead in working with allies and partners to 
foster the development of clear international norms for the use of lethal force by 
states outside of traditional hot battlefields. Such norms are vital to ensuring that 
efforts to combat new threats do not have the unintended consequences of under-
mining the rule of law.
° These norms should rest upon a joint commitment to ensuring that 
states have the ability to respond effectively to nontraditional threats 
from nontraditional actors and a commitment to ensuring that even in 
nontraditional conflicts, the use of lethal force is consistent with core 
rule of law principles and respect for fundamental human rights.
° At a minimum, these norms should seek to ensure that rules and prac-
tices relating to the state use of lethal force are transparent and clear; 
that lethal force will not be used without adequate safeguards to pre-
vent arbitrariness and protect against error and abuse; and that im-
partial accountability mechanisms are available to investigate credible 
allegations of error and abuse, and, if appropriate, provide remedies.
° Ideally, these norms should also address sovereignty consider-
ations and the scope of anticipatory self-defense in the context of 
evolving threats.
6. Assess UAV-related technological developments and likely future 
trends, and create an interagency research and development strategy 
geared toward advancing US national security interests in a manner 
consistent with US values.
• We urge the executive branch to undertake a thoroughgoing interagency review 
to evaluate technological developments and likely future evolution of UAVs with 
lethal capabilities.
• This review should also flag any legal, ethical and strategic implications of emerg-
ing UAV-related technologies, including the possible future development of au-
tonomous weapons systems.
• This review and analysis should lead to the development of a holistic interagency 
research, development and use strategy for UAVs.
7. Review and reform UAV-related export control rules and FAA rules, 
with a view to minimizing unnecessary regulatory burdens on the 
development of the US UAV industry, while still safeguarding US national 
security interests and ensuring responsible UAV development and use.
• As more foreign nations obtain UAV manufacturing capability and as the mili-
tary and civilian applications of UAVs multiply in number and evolve in sophisti-
cation, the US government should analyze carefully whether the current national 
and multilateral export control regime is well tailored to today’s UAV prolifera-
tion threats and opportunities. 
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° The United States should develop a sophisticated UAV export control 
strategy that accounts for current national and international security 
risks and priorities; establishes UAV-specific non-proliferation objec-
tives; and preserves the US interest in maintaining an adequate defense 
industrial base, a military technological edge in UAV systems, and in-
fluence over global UAV markets.
° The US government should premise changes to the US UAV export 
control regime, as well as US proposals at the international level, on a 
detailed study of current UAV industry conditions, UAV capabilities of 
concern, and the impact of current export control regulations on UAV 
exports and development. 
■ The US government should gather information on the growth 
trends in UAV markets, with a particular focus on the commercial 
growth potential for Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 
Category II UAVs. 
■ The US government should study the availability of UAVs from for-
eign countries — both those countries that are party to and not 
party to the MTCR and the Wassenaar Arrangement — to help 
determine if controls on the export of US UAV systems are well 
tailored to today’s international UAV market. 
■ The US government should also inquire into the broader non-pro-
liferation effect of the MTCR Category I presumption of denial. 
The US government should determine whether, in the long run, 
the presumption remains a useful non-proliferation tool or inad-
vertently fosters the growth of foreign UAV manufacturing capa-
bility by suppressing the participation of US industry in the global 
MTCR Category I UAV market. 
■ The US government should evaluate and identify the characteris-
tics of UAVs that pose particular security concerns beyond the tra-
ditional MTCR Category I 500 kg/300 km threshold (e.g., speed, 
radar cross-section, swarming capability, surveillance payload, low 
observable features, armor and anti-aircraft countermeasures). 
° The US government should propose any appropriate reforms to the 
multilateral export control regime as well as US law and policy in 
light of this analysis, and consistent with the broader strategic reviews 
recommended above. Such revised export control likely would make 
more granular distinctions between types of UAVs beyond the MTCR 
Category I and II rubric, such as the following: 
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■ Severe restrictions could be applied for armed UAVs meant for 
combat operations, given the security concerns with such UAVs 
and the lack of significant foreign availability; 
■ While preserving the MTCR Category I presumption of denial, 
establish particular factors to consider in deciding whether to 
overcome the presumption. These could include the national se-
curity costs and benefits of the end-use, the UAV characteristics 
or system modifications, and the overall benefit to the US defense 
industrial base and to the nation’s UAV technological edge from 
the transaction; and 
■ Licensing guidance to place greater scrutiny on UAVs that exhibit 
certain capabilities of particular proliferation concern beyond the 
MTCR Category I and Category II characteristics. 
° The US government should consider rules that encourage the export of 
“UAV services” or other alternatives to the transfer of ownership and 
control of UAV systems to foreign buyers. In contexts where such al-
ternatives are commercially feasible, this approach may yield many of 
the security benefits of greater US UAV exports, but without the atten-
dant proliferation risks that come with the full transfer of controlled 
technology. In addition, in light of the adverse effects of ambiguity in 
export control rules, the US government should also strive to provide 
reasonable clarity in its regulations and policies so that UAV manu-
facturers are aware of the specific capabilities and characteristics that 
will result in stricter or more lenient export control. In particular, it 
would be consistent with the overall principles of the administration’s 
Export Control Reform initiative to provide technical criteria that 
warrant treating UAVs as subject to the stricter controls of the State 
Department’s International Traffic in Arms Regulations. For instance, 
current criteria might involve resolution capability of surveillance 
payload, low observable features, armor and anti-aircraft countermea-
sures; it would be important to review the criteria frequently to keep 
pace with rapid technological change in the UAV sector.120 
8. Accelerate the FAA’s efforts to meet the requirements of the 2012 
FAA Reauthorization Bill. 
• The FAA should take rapid steps to ensure  the safe integration of civil un-
manned aircraft systems into the national airspace system by Sept. 30, 2015, 
as required by law. 
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• Before the September 2015 deadline, the FAA proactively should consider wheth-
er certain commercial UAVs can be safely operated in the national airspace prior 
to that date, and make exemptions as permitted by Section 333 of the 2012 FAA 
Reauthorization Bill. However, exemptions should be seen only as a stopgap mea-
sure toward the development of a comprehensive regulatory framework for both 
government and privately operated UAVs.121
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enriched by the invaluable insights and context provided by members of the three 
working groups. They are listed below (affiliations are listed for identification purposes 
only). Each working group is preparing a more detailed report discussing the issues 
within its ambit; those separate reports will be published in fall 2014. 
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